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Provider Liability Under Public Law 98-21:
The Medicare Prospective Payment System
in Light of Wickline v. State
INTRODUCTION
A T age forty-five, Lois Wickline began experiencing lower-
back pain. After an examination by her family practitioner
and by a vascular surgeon, the source of Mrs. Wickline's pain was
diagnosed as insufficient blood flow to her legs due to a vascular
disorder. A conservative course of treatment was undertaken for a
year but Mrs. Wickline's condition failed to improve. Circulation
to her legs deteriorated and Mrs. Wickline's physicians decided
that surgery was required.'
On January 7, 1977, bypass surgery was performed in order
to improve the flow of blood to Mrs. Wickline's legs. Within hours
of surgery, a blood clot formed in her right leg-a serious compli-
cation that necessitated immediate surgical removal of the clot.
Five days later, Mrs. Wickline underwent a third surgical proce-
dure and, subsequently, began physiotherapy in an effort to fur-
ther improve the circulation in her legs.2
Due to family financial difficulties, Mrs. Wickline's hospitaliza-
tion and medical treatments were covered by Medi-Cal.3 Under
the Medi-Cal reimbursement system, Mrs. Wickline's hospital stay
was only authorized for payment until 1:00 p.m. on January 17,
1977. 4 After that time, the hospital would not be entitled to reim-
1. Wickline v. State, No. NWC 60672 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. 1982) (an unre-
ported jury trial) as recounted in Carlova, A Jury Lands A $500,000 Haymaker On Health
Bureaucrats, 60 MED. ECON. 80 (1983).
2. Carlova, supra note 1, at 82.
3. Id. Medi-Cal is the State of California's program for the provision of health care
services to recipients of public assistance, as well as to the "medically indigent aged." CAL_
WELF. & INST. CODE § 14000 (West 1980). The purpose behind the Medi-Cal program is to
provide access to health care for those unable to afford the same access enjoyed by the
general public. Id. Utilization controls designed to contain the state's total expenditures for
health care for the needy are an integral part of the Medi-Cal program. Under Medi-Cal,
providers must seek authorization before rendering services. Only those services deemed
medically necessary will be authorized for payment by the Medi-Cal program. Id. § 14133.
4. Carlova, supra note 1, at 82.
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bursement for any care rendered. The post-surgical complica-
tions, however, necessitated a lengthier period of hospitalization
than the eleven days covered by the Medi-Cal plan. Mrs. Wick-
line's physicians requested an eight day extension from the Medi-
Cal Utilization Review nurse and consulting physician but Medi-
Cal approved only a four day extension. On January 21, 1977, at
the end of the four days, Mrs. Wickline was discharged from the
hospital.
Shortly after her discharge, a blood clot recurred in Mrs.
Wickline's right leg.5 Due to the severity of her condition, imme-
diate re-admission and further surgery was required. In two subse-
quent operations, Mrs. Wickline's right leg was amputated at mid-
thigh.
Mrs. Wickline sued the State of California, charging that the
state "carelessly and negligently abandoned" her at a time when
she was "in need of continuing hospital care."'7 At the close of the
trial, and after only four hours of deliberation, the jury returned
a verdict of $500,000 for Mrs. Wickline.8
Both the Medi-Cal system, and the way in which providers'
receive reimbursement for medical services rendered, were on
trial in Wickline v. State. The Wickline case exemplifies the situation
where provider liability arises or is increased by a reimbursement
system. The advent of prospective payment plans for hospital ser-
vices makes Mrs. Wickline's story, and the jury's verdict, a particu-
larly significant issue for providers and government agencies. The
most notable prospective reimbursement system, and the focus of
this Comment, is the Medicare prospective payment system, insti-
tuted by the federal government in 1983.
On April 20, 1983, President Reagan signed the Prospective
Payment for Medicare Inpatient Services Amendment to the So-
cial Security Act into law10 (The Prospective Payment Act). Under
this Act, providers are reimbursed before care is rendered, rather
than according to the previously used retrospective reimburse-
5. Id.
6. Id. at 83.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 85.
9. As used in this Comment, the term "providers" shall mean individuals and institu-
tions engaging in the delivery of health care services. Typically, provider is a term of art
used to describe hospitals and physicians.
10. Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (1983).
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ment formulation. Congress intended to create a payment system
based upon a profit motivation, thus fostering a more business-like
and cost-efficient health care delivery network.11 As the federal
government's Medicare program embarks on a prospective pay-
ment system that creates a strong profit incentive, the potential
for provider liability is increased.
This Comment will illuminate the sources of provider liability
that arise as a result of, or are enhanced by, the Prospective Pay-
ment Act. The analysis will begin by tracing the historical devel-
opment and rise of the prospective payment scheme adopted by
the federal government. The key components of the Prospective
Payment Act will be examined, with particular emphasis placed
upon the profit incentive established by the legislation. Potential
physician responses to the profit incentive will then be reviewed in
light of three possible sources of liability: malpractice, failure to
diagnose or adequately treat, and refusal to treat. The analysis
will explore likely hospital responses to the system and the poten-
tial for hospital liability based upon interference with physician
livelihood (staff privilege denial or curtailment) and financial con-
flict of interest. Finally, the analysis will consider the potential for
governmental liability created by prospective payment.
I. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT
SYSTEMS AND THE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ACT
In 1946, Congress enacted the Hill-Burton Act12 which pro-
vided federal funds to construct and strengthen the nation's hos-
pitals. 13 The Medicarel 4and Medicaidl 5programs, instituted by
11. H.R. REP. No. 98-25, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 132, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 219, 351.
12. Pub. L. No. 725, 60 Stat. 1040 (1946).
13. R. ROEMER, C. KRAEMER, J. FINK & M. ROEMER, PLANNING URBAN HEATH SERviCES
FROM JUNGLE TO SYSTEM 15 (1975) [hereinafter cited as R. ROEMER]. The Hill-Burton Pro-
gram was administered by the Facilities Planning and Construction Service of the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare from 1947 until 1971. During that period, the
program provided $3.7 billion for the construction and modernization of the nation's pub-
lic and private hospitals. In addition, funds were available in the form of direct and guaran-
teed loans to assist in hospital and emergency room construction. The primary purpose of
the Hill-Burton Program was to reduce the shortage of hospital beds existing in post-World
War II America, particularily in the rural areas of the nation. Additionally, the program
was intended to help alleviate the imbalance in health care facilities that existed between
wealthy and poorer states. Id. at 180-82.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1982).
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Congress in the mid-1960's, helped to ensure broad-based access
to the nation's hospital facilities."6
The intent behind the initial Medicare and Medicaid legisla-
tion was to provide equal access to health care; little attention was
given to cost or cost control.17 In fact, Medicare, Medicaid, and
the related third-party payer Blue Cross/Blue Shield, provided
major disincentives for cost savings. 18 The patient rarely, if ever,
paid the bills generated by medical treatment. In addition, third-
party payers reimbursed health care providers according to a ret-
rospective "reasonable cost" standard. As a result patients became
removed from the payment system to such an extent that they
were no longer aware of the actual cost of care. Providers were
likewise insulated because payment for services rendered was vir-
tually guaranteed.19 The inevitable consequence of this double-in-
sulation was a nearly exponential rate of increase in health care
costs. 0 Since the mid-1960's, the rise in health care costs has an-
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1982).
16. R. RoaElRl, supra note 13, at 7. Medicare, the major federal health care program,
was designed to ensure that all elderly citizens who are entitled to Social Security benefits
receive access to health care equal to that received by all other Americans. The elderly
were seen by Congress as a deserving group whose only bar to health care was the financial
disadvantage of retirement. Medicaid was intended to provide access to medical services for
the poor and indigent. Both Medicare and Medicaid provide access to health care facilities
for millions of Americans who, prior to the enactment of Pub. L. No. 89-97, had been
denied access to main-stream health care due to their inability to pay for services rendered.
Id.; F. THOMPSON, HEALTH POuCY AND THE BUREAUCRACY 109-85 (1981).
17. The legislation provided that the government would pay hospitals and physicians
according to a "reasonable cost" standard. In essence, as long as provider costs were
deemed to be reasonable-a slippery concept at best-they were paid. From 1967 to 1980,
Medicare enrollees rose from 19 million to 27.4 million in number. During that same pe-
riod, however, the total cost of care paid by the government under the Medicare program
rose from $2.8 million to $23.1 million.
Medicaid, like Medicare, fostered access and spared no expense. Eligibility requirements
for Medicaid benefits were left to the states' discretion. Under Medicaid, the federal gov-
ernment funded 50% of the cost of care, while the states funded the remainder. Initially,
some states were very liberal in their eligibility requirements. New York, perhaps the most
generous state, established eligibility requirements that entitled 45% of the state's popula-
tion to Medicaid benefits. Access, not cost, was the primary concern. F. THOMPSON, supra
note 16, at 111-12, 129-30, 154-85; Grimaldi, Prospective Payment Scheme Overhauls Hospi-
tals' Financial Incentives, 64 Hosp. PROGRESS 46, 48 (1983).
18. Grimaldi, supra note 17, at 46-48.
19. Id. at 48.
20. Id.; see also Shaffer, DRG's: History and Overview, 4 NURSING & HEALTH CARE 388,
389 (1983). Providers, under Medicare and most other third-party payment systems, were
virtually assured payment for whatever costs were incurred in caring for recipients. As long
as revenue exceeded costs, efficiency was not a major concern to providers. Moreover,
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nually outpaced inflation. In recent years, the disparity between
the general inflation rate and the rise in health care costs has ex-
panded greatly. For example, in 1983, the cost of health care in-
creased 12.6% while the overall inflation rate for the nation was a
modest 3 .9%.21
Skyrocketing health care costs and the subsequent, virtually
uncontrollable rise in Medicare expenditures, alarmed the federal
government. 2 The federal government projected that the Medi-
care system would operate at a $7 billion deficit by 1988.23 More
alarming than this prediction was the government's long-term
projection to the year 1995. By that year the Medicare Trust
Fund could be expected to operate at a $310 billion deficit.24
Searching for a solution, Congress enacted the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 25(TEFRA). As part of TEFRA,
the Department of Health and Human Services was directed to
develop a system of prospective payment for the inpatient medical
services of Medicare patients.26
In response to the directive of TEFRA, the Department of
Health and Human Services prepared its recommendations and
presented them to Congress with the support and backing of the
Reagan Administration.27 Within three months, Congress modi-
fied the Department's recommendations, and enacted the Pro-
spective Payment for Medicare Inpatient Hospital Services
under the retrospective "reasonable cost" standard of reimbursement, as costs rose so did
reimbursement payments. The absence of an incentive to conserve resources, therefore,
had a marked inflationary impact on total health care costs. Id.
21. Shaffer, supra note 20, at 388.
22. Since the early 1970's, the federal government has tried to stem the rise in Medi-
care expenditures through a variety of means. Among the efforts undertaken by the gov-
ernment was an increase in the amount of Medicare beneficiary co-payments, and the en-
couragement of alternate modes of health care delivery such as HMOs. The Upheaval in
Health Care, Bus. WK., July 25, 1983, at 45-46.
23. Grimaldi, supra note 17, at 47.
24. Id.
25. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982). TEFRA was the government's first step
toward making health care more business-like; efficiency was to be rewarded and ineffi-
ciency was to be penalized. As part of TEFRA, hospitals would be subject to cost-per-case
limits and a government imposed cap on the rate of increase for inpatient cost would be
imposed. 48 Fed. Reg. 39,426 (1983).
26. 48 Fed. Reg. 39,752 (1983).
27. H.R. REP. No. 98-25, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 132, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 219, 351.
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Amendment to the Social Security Act."8
In enacting the Prospective Payment Act, Congress stated:
The bill is intended to improve the Medicare program's ability to act as a
prudent purchaser of services, and to provide predictability regarding pay-
ment amounts for both the Government and hospitals. More important, it is
intended to reform the financial incentives hospitals face, promoting effi-
ciency in the provision of services by rewarding cost-effective hospital
practices.2'
Clearly, Congress intended to radically alter the hospitals' finan-
cial incentives.
Implicit in the legislation is the realization that the old retro-
spective reimbursement system provided an incentive to over-treat
and over-hospitalize, resulting in the increased cost of care and
increased lengths of stay.30 In contrast, the new Medicare prospec-
tive payment system seeks to encourage cost savings by providing
a set payment for each episode of care, i.e., each hospital stay."1 As
demonstrated by the first available statistical data, lengths of stay
can be reduced and the overall cost of care more easily predicted
and controlled through the use of prospective reimbursement. 2
II. KEY COMPONENTS OF THE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ACT
A. The DRG Concept and the Profit Incentive
The cornerstone of the Prospective Payment Act is the Diag-
nosis Related Group 3 (DRG), first introduced in the New Jersey
prospective payment experiment in 1978."' DRGs are patient clas-
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Grimaldi, supra note 17, at 48. Under retrospective reimbursement, hospitals were
reimbursed for all "reasonable costs" incurred. Hospitals were, in effect, encouraged to
treat and continue to treat so long as their revenue exceeded their costs-regardless of the
benefit of the care, provided. Conversely, prospective payment systems penalize providers
who fail to conserve. Payments are fixed in advance so that hospitals that overtreat, and
exceed the prepaid rate, suffer financial loss. Id.
31. Widem, Prospective Payment For Psychiatric Hospitalization: Context and Background,
35 HosP. AND COMMUNrrY PSYCHIATRY 447, 447-48 (1984).
32. Headlines: Hospitals Respond to Decreased Demand, HosPrrALs, Sept. 1, 1984, at 22.
Hospitals, the journal of the American Hospitals Association, presented an analysis of the
data available for the period October, 1983, through April, 1984, for hospitals participat-
ing in the Medicare prospective payment system.
33. 48 Fed. Reg. 39,752 (1983) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.409 & 405.489).
34. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 31B-5.1 (1984). In 1978, New Jersey began a prospective
payment experiment utilizing the DRG concept. DRGs were initially the product of a Yale
[Vol. 34
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sifications based upon the patient's diagnosis and the treatment
modality employed by the provider. Congress reasoned that DRGs
were a rational device to use since diagnosis related "groups...
are clinically coherent and homogeneous with respect to resource
use.' 3" In other words, DRGs give providers an easy way to define
the "products" -in the business sense-that their services
produced.
Under the Prospective Payment Act, the Secretary of Health
and Human Services is directed to develop a payment rate for
each DRG based upon a blending of regional and national average
cost factors.3 6 During the initial four year phase-in period the
DRG rate will be composed only of national cost factors.3 7 There-
after, DRG rates will be adjusted annually to reflect changes in
the national cost of care.38
Underlying the DRG system is the concept that the treatment
of each patient, and each episode of institutionalization, is a dis-
University study and proposal aimed at reducing health care expenditures. See Shaffer,
supra note 20, at 390-91. The New Jersey code defines DRGs as representing "categories
of hospital inpatients with similar clinical characteristics; and. . . patients in each DRG can
be expected to consume similiar amounts of hospital resources." N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, §
31B-5.1 (1984).
The New Jersey prospective payment system applies the DRG concept to all patients
(including those covered by Blue Cross/Blue Shield and all other third party payers),
whereas, the Prospective Payment Act applies only to Medicare beneficiaries. Shaffer,
supra note 20, at 390-91.
35. H.R. REP. No. 98-25, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 136, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 219, 355 (1983). The Medicare prospective payment system utilized 470 DRGs.




DRG 417 Septicemia Age 17
DRG 486 Alcohol dependence
DRG 441 Hand procedures for injuries
DRG 446 Multiple trauma
DRG 392 Splenectomy
DRG 316 Renal failure
49 Fed. Reg. 27,422, 27,447-27,457 (1984).
36. Grimaldi, supra note 17, at 49.
37. 42 U.S.C § 1395ww (1982). Initially, the rate will be based 75% upon the regional
average cost and 25% upon the national average cost of caring for patients with the partic-
ular diagnosis. By year four, the rate will be based 100% upon the national average and 0%
upon the regional average, with the proportions having changed 25% each year. 48 Fed.
Reg. 39,752, 39,824 (1983) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 405.474).
38. 48 Fed. Reg. 39,752, 39,824 (1983) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 405.474).
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crete unit of hospital "product."39 In an effort to foster a more
business-like efficiency in patient treatment, each DRG's "prod-
uct" is seen to require substantially the same input.4 0 It is the con-
cept of substantially similar inputs that enables the Medicare sys-
tem to treat different diagnoses as groupable and to develop an
average cost of care for each group.
Significantly, the prospective payment rate predetermined for
each DRG bears no direct relationship to the actual cost of caring
for any given patient. The rate merely represents the average cost
of caring for a typical patient presenting a particular diagnosis.4 1
It is the combination of the prospective nature of the DRG pay-
ment, and the absence of a direct relationship between a pro-
vider's cost of care and the DRG payment, that creates the profit
incentive. A hospital that is able to treat patients at a total cost
below the DRG payment rate realizes a profit. Conversely, an in-
stitution that treats at a total cost above the DRG prospective pay-
ment rate will incur a loss.
42
The profit incentive created by the Medicare prospective pay-
ment system presents a number of legal and ethical problems for
providers.4 Medicare payments to hospitals are based upon each
institution's total Medicare patient "output."'4" One way to in-
crease profits is to alter the institution's "output" so that the only
"products" produced are those in DRGs in which the hospital op-
erates at a profit. An institution may alter its "output" either
through case mix adjustments4 5 or through the ethically question-
39. Grimaldi, supra note 17, at 49.
40. See Shaffer, supra note 20.
41. Grimaldi, supra note 17, at 4647.
42. Widem, supra note 31, at 447; The Upheaval in Health Care, supra note 22, at 44.
43. As providers find waks to cope with the new payment system, and to maintain
their financial viability, patient care or access to care may suffer. It has been suggested that
the attempt to make health care more business-like is the prelude to the difficult moral and
ethical question of "whether Americans want to pay $50,000 to $100,000 for care of an
85-year-old patient whose quality of life is gone." The Upheaval in Health Care, supra note
22, at 52. Moreover, it has been suggested that provider response to Medicare's prospec-
tive payment system may lead to the restriction of access to care for the elderly. The ques-
tion then becomes: Who will care for those citizens who fall through the cracks of the
health care system? For a more thorough discussion of the ethical considerations, see
Widem, supra note 31, at 450-51. See also The Upheaval In Health Care, supra note 22, at 52-
56.
44. Grimaldi, supra note 17, at 49.
45. "Output" is the measure of an institution's total number and case mix of patients.
Case mix represents the variety and proportion of diagnoses presented by the institution's
[Vol. 34
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able means of "patient skimming"4 or "dumping."' 7 The profit
incentive created by the Prospective Payment Act is strong, and it
is this profit motive that increases the potential for provider
liability.
B. Mandatory Utilization Review
Congress mandated Utilization Review in order to ensure that
hospitals provide quality medical care-as opposed to providing
care at variance with community standards in an effort to keep
costs below the DRG payment rate.' Under the Act, providers
must contract with a Utilization and Quality Control Peer Review
Organization 49 (PRO). Each PRO is required to randomly review
patient population. An institution may change its output by manipulating its case mix. Such
manipulation of case mix is known as case mix adjustment. Zuckerman, The Impact of DRG
Reimbursement on Strategic Planning, 29 ACHA J. 40, 43-48 (1984).
46. See Widem, supra note 31, at 450-51. Patient skimming "refers to hospitals' strat-
egy of referring patients who are in less 'profitable' diagnostic groups or patients who are
more severely ill to other, usually public, hospitals in order to maximize their own reim-
bursement." Id. at 450.
47. Roemer & Mera, "Patient-Dumping" and Other Voluntary Agency Contributions to Pub-
lic Agency Problems, 11 MED. CARE 30, 30 (1973). "Dumping" is the concept of refusing
access to an individual or a group. In other words, those patients are dumped from the
system.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-1 (1982). fhe provision states:
The purpose of this part is to establish the contracting process which the
Secretary must follow pursuant to the requirements of section 1395y(g) of this
title, including the definition of the utilization and quality control peer review
organizations with which the Secretary shall contract, the functions such peer
review organizations are to perform. The confidentiality of medical records,
and related administrative matters to facilitate the carrying out of the purposes
of this part.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-I (1982).
The term "utilization and quality control peer review organization" means
an entity which-
(1)(A) is composed of a substantial number of the licensed doctors of
medicine and osteopathy engaged in the practice of medicine or surgery in the
area and who are representative of the practicing physicians in the area, desig-
nated by the Secretary under section 1320c-2 of this title, with respect to which
the entity shall perform services under this part, or (B) has available to it, by
arrangement or otherwise, the services of a sufficient number of licensed doc-
tors of medicine or osteopathy engaged in the practice of medicine or surgery
in such area to assure that adequate peer review of the services provided by the
various medical specialties and subspecialties can be assured; and
(2) is able, in the judgment of the Secretary, to perform review functions
required under section 1320c-3 of this title in a manner consistent with the
efficient and effective administration of this part and to perform reviews of the
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participating hospitals' patient charts to determine the appropri-
ateness of admissions, admission patterns, discharges, transfers
and lengths of stay.8 0 In addition, the completeness, adequacy and
pattern of quality of care in an area of medical practice where actual perform-
ance is measured against objective criteria which define acceptable and ade-
quate practice.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3 (1982).
Any utilization and quality control peer review organization entering into a
contract with the Secretary under this part must perform the following
functions:
(1) The organization shall review some or all of the professional activities in
the area, subject to the terms of the contract, of physicians and other health
care practitioners and institutional and noninstitutional providers of health care
services in the provision of health care services and items for which payment
may be made (in whole or in part) under subchapter XVIII of this chapter for
the purpose of determining whether-
(A) such services and items are or were reasonable and medically neces-
sary and whether such services and items are not allowable under subsection
(a)(1) or (a)(9) of section 1395y of this title;
(B) the quality of such services meets professionally recognized standards
of health care; and
(C) in case such services and items are proposed to be provided in a hospi-
tal or other health care facility on an inpatient basis, such services and items
could, consistent with the provision of appropriate medical care, be effectively
provided more economically on an outpatient basis or in an inpatient health
care facility of a different type.
(2) The organization shall determine, on the basis of the review carried out
under subparagraphs (A) and (C) of paragraph (1), whether payment shall be
made for services under subchapter XVIII of this chapter. Such determination
shall constitute the conclusive determination on those issues for purposes of
payment under subchapter XVIII of this chapter, except that payment may be
made if-
(A) such payment is allowed by reason of section 1395pp of this title;
(B) in the case of inpatient hospital services or extended care services, the
peer review organization determines that additional time is required in order to
arrange for postdischarge care, but payment may be continued under this sub-
paragraph for not more than two days, but only in the case where the provider
of such services did not know and could not reasonably have been expected to
know (as determined under section 1395pp of this title) that payment would not
otherwise be made for such services under subchapter XVIII of this chapter
prior to notification by the organization under paragraph (3);
(C) such determination is changed as the result of any hearing or review
of the determination under section 1320c-4 of this title; or
(D) such payment is authorized under section 1395x(v)(1)(G) of this title.
(3) Whenever the organization makes a determination that any health care
services or items furnished or to be furnished to a patient by any practitioner or
provider are disapproved, the organization shall promptly notify such practi-
tioner or provider, such patient, and the agency or organization reponsible for
the payment of claims under subchapter XVIII of this chapter. In the case of
practitioners and providers of services, the organization shall provide an oppor-
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quality of the treatment rendered is to be assessed, and the valid-
ity of diagnostic and procedural information must be certified.,,
Institutions providing inadequate care or displaying multiple or
unnecessary admissions, may be terminated from participation in
the Medicare program.52
Although Congress clearly desired to encourage cost efficient
care, PRO review was intended to provide a degree of certainty
that the care rendered is of an acceptable quality.53 Some com-
mentators have suggested that the mixture of cost containment
and "quality control" may lead to a redefinition of the accepted
standard of care.5 4 Those who foresee a change in quality employ
a theory akin to the "tail-wagging-the-dog" cliche: If providers
will receive X dollars for treating a patient with illness Y, they will
only render X dollars worth of care to any patient presenting that
diagnosis. Over time, the level of care that X dollars will purchase
becomes the "new" community standard of care for that illness
and will thus be the new measure of quality care.5 As of now, the
effects of the DRG based prospective payment scheme on the
standard of care is unclear. It will be interesting to see if those
who predict change are correct.""
C. Payment of "Outlier" Charges
Under the Prospective Payment Act hospitals may seek addi-
tional compensation for the provision of care to "outliers. ' 57 Out-
liers are those patients whose lengths of stay exceed the average
length of stay, or whose severity of illness causes the cost of care
tunity for discussion and review of the determination.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Grimaldi, supra note 17, at 50-51; H.R. REP. No. 98-25, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 143-
45, reprinted in 1983 U.S. ConE CONG. & An. NEWS 219, 362-64.
54. Pettingill & Westell, Unanswered Questions Facing DRG's, Hosp. Topics July/Aug.
1984, at 3 (quality care will be redefined to be that level of care that "satisfices"); Note,
Medicare's Prospective Payment System: Can Quality Care Survive?, 69 IowA L. Rav. 1417 (1984)
(suggests implementation of a patient grievance mechanism to stem erosion in quality of
care).
55. See Pettingill & Westell, supra note 54, at 3.
56. For a discussion of the quality of care, the pressures on quality of care, and the
mechanisms employed by the Prospective Payment Act to ensure quality, see Note, supra
note 54.
57. 49 Fed. Reg. 234, 266 (1984) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 405.475).
1985] 1021
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to exceed the average DRG rate.5" Providers may apply for addi-
tional payments in cases where a particular patient's length of stay
exceeds that mean length of stay for the applicable DRG, or
where the patient's length of stay is below the DRG average but
the cost of care exceeds the DRG rate.59
Applications for outlier payments are to be reviewed on an
individual case basis by the PRO. 60 If the PRO approves the medi-
cal necessity and appropriateness of the outlier services, in rela-
tion to the entire length of stay, and if the PRO certifies that all
of the services were medically necessary and delivered in the most
appropriate setting, the outlier charges will be paid.61 Non-ap-
proval bears the obvious result that the provider will incur a fi-
nancial loss for those services rendered beyond the DRG rate. 2
Again, the purpose of the prospective payment system, and the
relative difficulty of outlier charge approval, is meant to en-
courage providers to engage in cost-efficient medical service
delivery.
III. SOURCES OF PROVIDER LIABILITY ENHANCED BY THE
PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT Aar
The Congressional emphasis on "promoting efficiency. . . by
rewarding cost/effective hospital practices" 63 enhances a number
of sources of provider liability. Specifically, the potential for pro-
vider liability may be increased by the Prospective Payment Act in
five ways. First, providers may be encouraged by the profit incen-
tive to commit acts of medical malpractice by misallocating re-
sources-i.e., undertreating or rendering unnecessary treatment.
Second, under the prospective payment system, providers may be
encouraged to breach the duty to treat their Medicare patients.
Third, the Prospective Payment Act may encourage providers to
refuse to treat some or all Medicare recipients. Fourth, the pro-





62. See The Upheaval in Health Care, supra note 22, at 44-46; see also Widem, supra note
31, at 447-48.
63. H.R REP. No. 98-25, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 1, 132, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 219, 351.
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tailment of hospital staff privileges to "over-treating" physicians is
encouraged. This may result in a charge by doctors of interfer-
ence with livelihood. Finally, the incentives created by prospective
payment create an environment ripe for charges of provider fi-
nancial conflicts of interest.
A. Medical Malpractice: The Misallocation of Health Care Resources
Under the Prospective Payment Act
Physicians and hospitals have a legal duty to provide care con-
sistent with the community's standard of care." Any breach of
that duty subjects the provider to malpractice liability. 5 Under
the doctrine of vicarious liability, hospitals may be liable for acts
of malpractice perpetrated by physicians working within hospital
facilities. 6 The profit incentive created by the Prospective Pay-
ment Act encourages physicians and hospitals to engage in acts of
medical malpractice. Providers are encouraged to misallocate the
health care resources used in treating their patients, leading to
the undertreatment of, or the rendering of, unnecessary care to
Medicare patients.
1. Undertreatment. Inherent in the Medicare prospective pay-
ment system is the incentive to provide the least amount of service
during the shortest length of stay, i.e., to remain within the aver-
age length of stay and service intensity parameters. 67 If, in an ef-
fort to keep costs at or below the DRG rate, the care rendered
falls below the community standard, the provider may be liable
for malpractice. 8 One way that a provider may be found to have
64. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 50 Ill. App. 2d 253, 200
N.E.2d 149 (1964), afd, 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U. 946
(1966) (physician, hospital and nursing treatment of plaintiff's leg injury failed to meet the
community standard of care).
65. Id.
66. Hospitals are subject to liability for proximately sustained injuries, and under the
doctrine of vicarious liability for proximately sustained injuries caused by the negligence of
hospital agents or employees occurring within the scope of their employment. Smith v.
John C. Lincoln Hosp., 118 Ariz. 549, 578 P.2d 630 (Ct. App. 1978); Ulmer v. Baton
Rouge Gen. Hosp., 361 So. 2d 1238 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656,
143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957); Magwood v. Jewish Hosp. & Medical Center, 96
Misc. 2d 251, 408 N.Y.S.2d 983 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
67. See Grimaldi, supra note 17, at 48; See also The Upheaval in Health Care, supra note
22, at 44-48.




rendered care at variance with the community standard is by pre-
maturely discharging a patient. 9 A second type of variant care is
the failure to utilize available diagnostic and treatment tools.70
Both forms of undertreatment-negative allocation of re-
sources-are encouraged by the Prospective Payment Act. The
severity of the malpractice threat requires an in-depth analysis of
the basis of liability and how the prospective payment increases
the likelihood of liability.
It is clearly established under the common law that the dis-
charge of a patient creates provider liability when the patient's
condition makes such discharge unreasonable. 1 In Meiselman v.
Crown Heights Hospital72 the plaintiff, a minor, was discharged
while still experiencing a fever and drainage from a leg wound.
After discharge, the plaintiff's condition worsened, necessitating
re-admission to the hospital. As a result of the untimely discharge,
the plaintiff was severely crippled. The hospital was found to have
negligently treated the plaintiff by virtue of the premature
discharge."
One of the most interesting facets of Meiselman v. Crown
Heights Hospital is the court's note that the discharge was
prompted by the patient's inability to pay for further care.7 4 Al-
though the court merely stated this fact and did not directly link it
to liability, the court's awareness of the hospital's financial motiva-
tion hints at an underlying concern regarding discharges based
upon inability to pay. The legal consequences of a discharge based
solely upon a patient's ability to pay for care are illustrated by the
Wickline case.
The jury's conclusion that the State of California was liable
for Mrs. Wickline's premature discharge, should not be viewed
with a sigh of relief by hospitals and physicians. Although the hos-
pital and treating physicians were not parties to the action, they
69. See infra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
71. Corten v. Harbor Hosp. Inc., 279 A.D. 673, 108 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1951). In Corten,
the plaintiff was discharged, but, the discharge was based upon administrative convenience,
not medical considerations. The hospital was liable for the injuries sustained by the plain-
tiff, since the discharge was untimely in light of the patient's medical condition.





could easily have been included in the suit.7 5 Mrs. Wickline
elected not to sue her physicians because she had a good rapport
with them and felt that they cared for her to the fullest extent of
their powers.
7 8
Similarly, she felt that the hospital and its staff were excellent
and were in no way at fault.7 Had Mrs. Wickline not felt as
strongly about the quality of her care, the hospital and physicians
involved could have been held liable for malpractice.
Providers faced with the prospect of rendering free care to
Medicare patients whose treatment needs exceed the DRG pay-
ment rate may elect to discharge outliers rather than risk incur-
ring financial losses .7 The implication of Meiselman and Wickline is
that discharges prompted by a patient's inability to pay resulting
from the restrictions imposed by the prospective payment cap,
may result in liability to hospitals and physicians.
Undertreatment, however, may not always be as blatantly ap-
parent as premature discharge. When treating Medicare patients,
physicians may be pressured by administrators to reduce their use
of diagnostic and treatment procedures in order to keep costs
within the DRG rates.
1 9
Diagnostic and treatment devices have historically been em-
ployed extensively by physicians, both as a result of the practice of
defensive medicine to combat the rise of malpractice litigation
and because of the increasing diversity and technical advancement
of the tools available to practitioners.8 " Although providers may
feel financial pressure to use diagnostic and treatment devices con-
servatively, case law has established that medical malpractice lia-
bility exists when the failure to use available diagnostic or treat-
ment devices results in injury to the patient.8 '
75. See Carlova, supra note 1, at 80.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See The Upheaval in Health Care, supra note 22, at 48-52; Chenen, supra note 70.
79. Pettingill & Westell, supra note 54, at 3; see also The Upheaval in Health Care, supra
note 22, at 45-53.
80. Pettingill & Westell, supra note 54, at 3; see also S. LAw & S. PoL.AN, PAIN AND
PROFIT. THE POLITICS OF MALPRACTICE 114-16 (1978).
81. Golanka v. Gatewood, 199 Neb. 216, 257 N.W.2d 403 (1977) (physician's failure
to conduct proper and adequate diagnostic testing was negligence); Wilkinson v. Vesey,
110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972) (physician's omission of available diagnostic devices is
evidence of negligence); Gates v. Jensen, 92 Wash. 2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979) (en banc)
(reasonable prudence requires the use of further testing and examination when the pa-
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The implication of the case law is that medical necessity and
the community standard of reasonable care-not financial consid-
erations-should determine the level of diagnosis and treatment
undertaken . 2 Although there has not yet been a case involving
the failure to diagnose or treat a prospective payment plan pa-
tient, it is not improbable that such an action will occur. The fi-
nancial incentive to contain costs, a feature inherent in the Pro-
spective Payment Act, clearly increases the likelihood that
providers will minimize costs by reducing their use of diagnostic
and treatment devices.
2. Unnecessary Care. In addition to encouraging curtailed
treatment, the DRG based prospective payment system increases
unnecessary hospitalization. Hospitals are reimbursed based upon
their Medicare product "output." ' s Patients with multiple diagno-
ses, and those who could be treated on an outpatient basis, might
be admitted and re-admitted for inpatient care in order to boost
the number of hospital discharges (output), thereby increasing fu-
ture Medicare payments." Any injury occurring during a period
of unnecessary hospitalization raises the specter of provider mal-
practice liability. In addition, rendering unnecessary care places
the provider at risk under the doctrine of informed consent.8 5 By
encouraging the provision of unnecessary care, the profit incen-
tive created by the Prospective Payment Act again increases the
likelihood of provider liability.
tient's condition indicates a need for additional diagnosis).
82. See Chenen, supra note 68.
83. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
84. See Kaufman, Deregulation of the Health Care Industry: Implications of Financial
Change, HEALTH CARE STRATEGic MGart. October 1983, at 4. The potential for re-admis-
sion of Medicare patients in order to boost provider income is more real than it may seem.
Currently, five percent of all Medicare patients are re-admitted for care within five days of
discharge, and 22% are re-admitted within sixty days. It has been suggested that a 10%
reduction in re-admissions will net a $1 billion savings for the government. Commentators
arrived at the 10% reduction figure by concluding that at least one-tenth of the current
Medicare re-admissions may be unnecessary or avoidable. See Anderson & Steinberg, Hospi-
tal Readmissions in the Medicare Population, 311 NEw ENG. J. OF MED. 1349, 1351-53 (1984).
85. B. WERTHMANN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW: How MEDICINE IS CHANGING THE LAW
24-25, 86, 195 (1965).
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B. Breaching the Duty to Treat Under Prospective Payment
It is well established that medical necessity should dictate the
level of treatment provided."6 Physicians and hospitals are under a
legal duty, once treatment has begun, to provide all the care nec-
essary to treat each patient. Courts have long held that providers
are liable for damages sustained when the need for medical treat-
ment continues and the provider discontinues that treatment.
87
The obligation to continue treatment arises by virtue of an im-
plied contract between the provider and the patient.8 Failure on
the part of the provider to render medically necessary care may
be deemed a breach of that duty, subjecting the provider to liabil-
ity.8 9 Moreover, such a breach may be deemed an act of bad faith,
creating liablility for punitive damages.90
The Prospective Payment Act's strong financial disincentive
to treat patients places providers in a position where a breach of
that duty may be virtually inevitable. Providing care beyond that
covered by the DRG rate, in effect, forces hospitals to provide
free care. Although alternatives to free treatment may be availa-
ble, for example, transferring patients to another facility, the al-
ternatives may leave the hospital in no better financial condition.91
Again, hospitals may elect to cease medical treatment of patients
whose cost of care exceeds the DRG reimbursement rate, rather
than incur financial losses. If such patients can establish that they
were injured because necessary treatment was denied due to
purely economic considerations, then a breach of the duty to
86. See White v. Edison, 361 So. 2d 1292 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 363 So. 2d 915
(La. 1978) (patient's condition required medical attention to continue after discharge, how-
ever, physician failed to administer further treatments).
87. See Thaggard v. Vafes, 218 Ala. 609, 119 So. 647 (1928); Reed v. Laughlin, 332
Mo. 424, 58 S.W.2d 440 (1933); Crooks v. Jonas, 204 N.C. 797, 169 S.E. 218 (1933);
Mehigan v. Sheehan, 94 N.H. 274, 51 A.2d 632 (1947).
88. Chenen, supra note 68.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See 42 C.F.R. § 405.470(c) (1984). Although hospitals may transfer Medicare pa-
tients to other facilities-such as public hospitals-the transferring hospital may suffer a
penalty. The transferring hospital will receive per diem payment for the patient's stay prior
to transfer, however, the transfer will not count as a discharge. As stated earlier, future
payments are based on output or total number of Medicare discharges. Hospitals that
transfer patients who will be outliers, therefore, will avoid financial loss only during the




treat-and possibly bad faith-may be easily established 2
In the Wickline case, if Mrs. Wickline had not held her physi-
cians in such high esteem, they might have been liable for such a
breach. In fact, the State of California tried to establish that it was
the physician's breach of the duty to treat, rather than Medi-Cal's
refusal to pay, that proximately caused Mrs. Wickline's injury.9 3 It
was the state's contention that Medi-Cal's decision only affected
the hospital's ability to receive payment for her continued care; it
in no way affected her ability to receive treatment, or her physi-
cian's duty to provide that treatment.9 4 Medi-Cal argued that Mrs.
Wickline's physicians and hospital could have waived their fees
and continued her treatment.9 5 Although Medi-Cal's attorneys
were unsuccessful in their attempt to discredit Mrs. Wickline's
health care providers, 6 if the physician-patient relationship had
not been strong or loyal-for example, a patient's first experience
with the physician or hospital-the outcome might have been less
favorable for the providers.
C. The Refusal to Treat Medicare Patients
In response to the financial incentive created by the Prospec-
tive Payment Act, providers may choose to refuse treatment to all
Medicare patients, or to those Medicare patients in DRGs for
which the institution operates least cost-efficiently, i.e., to alter the
institution's case mix so as to eliminate the treatment of patients
in DRGs that create financial losses.
The DRG based prospective payment system will force prov-
iders to focus their planning efforts on market segmentation, com-
petitive position analysis, strategic business units and financial
stimulation.97 Hospitals must understand their products and begin
to target services not only according to community needs, but also
in terms of producing the products that they do best and most
cost efficiently.98 This may result in restricting care to certain
92. Chenen, supra note 68, at 138; Will Prospective Payment Affect Liability?, 5 HOSPITAL
RISK MGMT. 97, 98 (1983).
93. Carlova, supra note 1, at 83-85.
94. Id. at 84.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 83-85.




types of patients through case mix adjustment or specialization.99
Specialization may be desirable, since it reflects not a compromise
in the quality of care, but a conscious decision on the part of the
provider to alter the patient population served.100 Although spe-
cialization may be an attractive and desirable alternative, it too
may be a source of provider liability. 0
Generally, individual hospitals have the right to refuse to ad-
mit anyone deemed ineligible for care by the Board of Trust-
ees.10 2 Hospitals are required, however, for public policy reasons,
to maintain emergency care facilities.103 Moreover, hospitals may
not refuse to render emergency care without cause.' 0 Further-
more, if an individual exhibits the unmistakable signs of an emer-
gency, treatment may not be refused.10 5 In the absence of an un-
mistakable emergency, a patient may only recover against the
refusing hospital by establishing that the proximate cause of in-
jury was the delay in treatment resulting from the initial refusal of
care.
108
The refusal to treat Medicare patients is not an inevitable
consequence of the prospective payment system. Yet it is not im-
probable that providers might limit access to their facilities by ex-
cluding unprofitable DRGs. In the absence of an unmistakable
emergency, the refusal to treat patients in those unprofitable
DRGs bears no legal consequences. 0 7 That is not to say that the
refusal to treat Medicare patients is not without consequences.
Such refusal, although bearing no legal consequences, may create
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. It should be noted, however, that specialization may not be a solution available to
all institutions. Rural hospitals may not be able to specialize, since alternate facilities may
be too distant to allow reasonable access for those patients segmented out. In the case of a
rural institution, such specialization may subject the hospital to liability based on a refusal
to treat.




105. See O'Neill v. Montefiore Hosp., 11 A.D.2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1960) (hospi-
tal liable for refusal to treat patient experiencing a heart attack who was insured by a plan
in which the defendant hospital did not participate); Dohan v. Stahlnecker, 313 Pa. Super.
279, 459 A.2d 1228 (1983) (hospital liable for refusing treatment to a patient experiencing
a heart attack).
106. 1 S. PEGAUS & H. WAcHSMAN, supra note 102, § 3:19, at 188.
107. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
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the ethical or public policy consequence of a discriminatory health
care delivery system based upon ability to pay. Moreover, refusal
to treat raises the question of who will treat those patients in the
unprofitable DRGs. Consideration of the ethical consequences of
the refusal to treat Medicare patients is, however, beyond the
scope of this Comment.108
D. Denial or Curtailment of Staff Privileges
Under prospective payment systems, physicians are the key to
- the financial viability of hospitals. Physicians are the persons actu-
ally utilizing hospital services since they order the tests, proce-
dures, supplies and medications administered to patients. Addi-
tionally, physicians determine when admission or discharge is
warranted. As a result, hospitals will desire physicians who are
able to treat patients at or below the DRG rates.10 9 Moreover,
hospitals may seek to curtail or deny privileges to physicians who
are not cost-efficient, i.e., those who do not use pre-admission test-
ing or other cost containing measures.110 Historically, the bulk of
the litigation concerning medical staff privileges has been in the
realm of anti-trust and anti-competition." The advent of pro-
spective payment may herald a rise in interference with liveli-
hood 2 litigation for both hospitals, and Credentials Commit-
tee 13 members who decide privileges questions, as hospitals begin
108. For a discussion of the ethical considerations involved with patient dumping (i.e.,
refusal to treat), see Roemer & Mera, supra note 47.
109. Chenen, supra note 68, at 138-41; Lawyer predicts increased risks under prospective
payment, 5 Hosp. RISK MGMT. 151, 151 (1983).
110. Lawyer predicts increased risk under prospective payment, supra note 109; Chenen,
supra note 68, at 138-41.
111. See Note, Due Process Considerations in Hospital Staff Privileges Cases, 7 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 217 (1979).
112. Chenen, supra note 68, at 138-41; Will Prospective Payment Affect Liability?, supra
note 92, at 98.
113. Under guidelines established by the Joint Commission on Hospital Accreditation
(JCAH), the medical staff of every hospital is charged to:
ensure that each member is qualified for membership and shall strive to main-
tain the optimal level of professional performance of its members through the
appointment/reappointment procedures, the specific delineation of clinical
privileges, and the periodic reappraisal of each staff member.
JoINT COMM'N ON THE ACCREDrrATION OF HOSPITALS, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR Hospi-
TAIS 93 (1983).
The Credentials Committee is a committee of the medical staff, composed of physicians,
that has the responsibility of carrying out the JCAH charge stated above. The committee
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denying or curtailing the privileges of physicians who "over-
treat." Physicians do not have a constitutional right to hospital
privileges, therefore hospitals may be selective in granting staff
privileges. 114 Provided the hospital conforms to the procedural re-
quirements set forth in its by-laws and observes common law fair-
ness procedures, the hospital and its Credentials Committee may
escape liability for denying or curtailing physician privileges.115
An action to curtail or deny privileges based upon economic con-
siderations, in the absence of a by-law allowing such action could
subject the hospital and its Credentials Committee to liability for
interference with livelihood.116
The basis for a cause of action founded upon interference
with livelihood, is a recognition that the right and ability to prac-
tice medicine is a property right.1 17 An action to curtail or deny
hospital privileges clearly affects, and indeed abridges, physicians'
abilities to exercise their rights to practice, and consequently to
earn a living."" Hospital liability arises when the decision to deny
or curtail privileges is made in an arbitrary or capricious man-
ner.' A determination is arbitrary or capricious if it is made for
a reason not recognized by and stated in the hospital by-laws or
other institutional regulations. 120 Hospitals, therefore, will be
forced to modify their by-laws to allow such economic determina-
tions or they will face potential litigation due to interference with
livelihood.
reviews all applications for appointment and reappointment to all categories of the medical
staff. After review, the committee makes its recommendations to the hospital governing
body on each application regarding the privilieges to be granted. Determinations by the
committee are based on the hospital's by-laws and the applicant's training and experience.
Frequently, decisions are based upon the applicant's pattern of care as demonstrated by the
findings of peer review activities. Credentials are used by providers as control procedures
to ensure the competency of the medical staff. See W. FIFER, HOSPITAL ORGANIZATION AND
MANAGEMENT 426-27 (3d ed. 1983); J. McGIBONY, PRINICIPLES OF HOSPITAL ADMINISTRA-
TION 111 (1969).
114. Hayman v. Galveston, 273 U.S. 414 (1927).
115. Hackethal v. Loma Linda Community Hosp. Corp., 91 Cal. App. 3d 59, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 783 (1979).
116. Chenen, supra note 68, at 138-41.






E. Financial Conflict of Interest Encouraged by Prospective Payment
Another potential source of liability, faced by hospital-based
physicians, is the charge of financial conflict of interest. Certain
physicians, such as department heads, for example, may realize a
strong financial incentive to encourage department member physi-
cians to provide cost-efficient care.121 Such encouragement, if re-
sulting in successful cost savings for the institution, could net the
department a reward in the form of added funding or new equip-
ment from a thankful hospital administration. While the award
need not be blatantly tied to the cost-efficient care, the mere hint
that the most efficient physicians are being rewarded may bring a
charge of conflict of interest. 22 The possibility of a financial con-
flict of interest suit may be remote, but is yet another potential
source of liability increased by the Prospective Payment Act.
VI. THE IMPACT OF Wickline AND THE PROSPECT OF
GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY
Although the Medicare prospective payment system increases
the potential sources of provider liability, the message of Wickline
is that the government itself may be held accountable for any
harmful results arising from the operation of its health care reim-
bursement system. The State of California was found liable for
Mrs. Wickline's injuries. However, with respect to the issue of
governmental liability, Wickline must be seen as an aberration.
The jury held the state liable under the Prospective Payment Act
due to a set of circumstances that will probably not be repeated.
A. The Peculiarities of Wickline
One of the factors cited by the Wickline jurors as critical in
their assessment of liability against the state was the fact that a
nurse, not a doctor, who did not even visit or interview Mrs.
Wickline, made the final determination that only a four day exten-
sion was warranted. Additionally, the jurors felt that because of
the Medi-Cal nurse's refusal to grant a longer extension, it was the
state and not the provider that made the determination to termi-




nate Mrs. Wickline's treatment.123 The Wickline scenario is un-
likely to be repeated, however, under the patient discharge mech-
anism prescribed by the Medicare prospective payment system.
Under the Medicare system, the hospital and attending physi-
cian must directly determine when treatment is to end.124 The phy-
sician must certify in writing that the patient no longer requires
hospitalization.1 25 If the physician does not agree with the hospi-
tal's assessment as to when inpatient care must end, either party
may seek a determination by the PRO.126 PRO concurrence with
the hospital's decision to discharge can replace the physician's cer-
tification.1 27 The hospital may be liable for any post-discharge
harm to the patient if the patient can establish that the injuries
sustained were the proximate result of the discharge. Likewise, by
establishing the same proximity, the patient may be able to re-
cover against the physician who certified the discharge. The gov-
ernment is likely to avoid liability, since it has no direct involve-
ment in the discharge decision. The discharge is the direct result
of the providers' determination that the patient no longer re-
quired inpatient care. This is in contrast to Wickline where the
state determined that inpatient care was to end. 2
The only situation that may place the government at risk ap-
pears to be one where the PRO steps in and concurs with the hos-
pital's determination that discharge is justified. In that case, as in
Wickline, the government may be open to liability for the actions
of its agents, i.e., the PRO. However, unlike Wickline, the govern-
ment may be able to successfully seek indemnification from the
hospital under the theory that the hospital in fact recommended
the discharge and the PRO's action was merely a concurrence in
that decision. The government may be successful in seeking in-
demnification since the Prospective Payment Act's discharge
mechanism is distinctly different from the one instituted by Medi-
Cal in Wickline. Under Medi-Cal's payment system, the government
determined when treatment should end; the hospital either con-
curred with the discharge decision or rendered free care. The
123. Carlova, supra note I, at 83-85.




128. Carlova, supra note 1, at 83-85.
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Prospective Payment Act forces hospitals and physicians to decide
when discharge is appropriate; the government merely concurs
with the provider's determination. It is apparent that by requiring
hospitals and physicians to make the determination as to when
treatment should cease, the government has insulated itself from
liability.
The major distinction between the Medicare prospective pay-
ment system and the Wickline Medi-Cal system is that under the
Prospective Payment Act hospitals and physicians are reminded of
their affirmative duty to provide quality care-a duty they must
maintain regardless of the payment received. 129 Cost containment
is an obvious goal, but one theoretically achieved by stimulating
competition and efficiency over the long-term, rather than by sac-
rificing quality.
Although by virtue of the Medi-Cal nurse intervention sys-
tem, Mrs. Wickline's physicians and hospital may have been re-
lieved of any further duty to provide care, the Prospective Pay-
ment Act does not have the same effect. It is the physician and the
hospital, not the government, who must make treatment and dis-
charge decisions. Providers who do not remember, or who take
lightly, their duty to render medically necessary care in keeping
with community standards may suffer the consequences of legal
liability.
CONCLUSION
The Medicare DRG based prospective payment system
presents a challenge to providers: Can quality health care be deliv-
ered in a cost-efficient, business-like manner? Through a set of
heavy-handed incentives, Congress has set in motion a provider
payment mechanism designed to rid the health care delivery sys-
tem of its old over-treat and over-hospitalize ways.
Although the -Prospective Payment Act provides the proce-
dural mechanisms and financial incentives to encourage cost-effi-
cient quality care, those same incentives and mechanisms increase
the possibility of provider liability. The strong financial incentive
to remain within the DRG payment rate encourages providers to
129. H.R. REP. No. 25, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 132, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 219, at 351; 42 C.F.R. § 405.472 (1984); Chenen, supra note 68, at 134-38; Will
Prospective Payment Affect Liability?, supra note 92, at 97-99.
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render care below the accepted community standard. The Pro-
spective Payment Act also encourages institutions to reward physi-
cians who are cost-efficient and to punish those who are not.
Moreover, in light of Wickline, the government itself may be sub-
ject to the prospect, albeit very slight, of liability.
The message of Wickline is that cost containment is no excuse
for providing care at a level below the accepted community stan-
dard. If cost-efficient health care is a national objective, providers
must strive to obtain that goal via routes that do not compromise
quality care. Providers who fail to deliver the quality of care ex-
pected by their community may face liability as a result of pro-
spective payment. The Prospective Payment Act's financial incen-
tives may lead to lower costs for the Medicare program, but in the
process enhance the potential for provider liability.
Ross P. LANZAFAME

